HHU-Sorbonne University Workshop, 11th-12th June,
Sorbonne University, France
https://sites.google.com/view/hhu-sorbonneconference/home
This workshop aims to extend the scientific pluralist stance into the
domain of scientific metaphysics. Although the metaphysics of science is
a vast field, pluralism offers both a way to pose new questions and a
means of addressing long-standing debates. Recent debates in metaphysics
suggest that concerns of this kind are far from out of place.
In the contemporary landscape of the general philosophy of science,
scientific pluralism has emerged as a prominent and wide-ranging
research program (Ludwig & Ruphy 2021; Ruphy 2016). According to the
pluralist agenda, there is no universal methodology (Feyerabend 1975);
reductionism fails to capture the complexity of scientific theories and
models (Fodor 1975; Mitchell 2009); and no single, fundamental ontology
(Dupré 1995) underlies scientific practice. Instead, the diversity of
scientific methods, aims, and practices (Chang 2012) has become a
central focus of analysis, leading philosophers of science toward what
Wylie (2015) aptly describes as a “pluralism of pluralisms.”
Recent debates in metaphysics suggest that concerns of this kind are far
from out of place. Markus Schrenk (2023), for instance, advances a
pluralist interpretation of David Lewis’s Best System Analysis of laws,
proposing a proliferation of best systems across the special sciences,
each retaining the autonomy to articulate its own vocabulary. Michela
Massimi (2022) similarly highlights the pluralism inherent in the
classification of natural kinds, emphasizing their historically and
culturally contingent, open-ended character. In the debate about the
metaphysical nature of probability, Mauricio Suárez (Suárez 2020)
proposes a tripartite pluralist ontology comprising propensities,
probabilities, and frequencies.
In a related vein, Hüttemann (2003, 2021) argues that part–whole
scientific explanations are non-hegemonic and grounded in relations of
mutual dependence, thereby giving rise to a form of “pragmatic
pluralism.” Similarly, James Ladyman (2024; Ladyman & Ross 2007) defends
the scale relativity of ontology, according to which entities,
processes, and structures exist at different scales of measurement,
potentially supporting a fruitful form of ontic pluralism.
List of participants:
Adrien Avramoglou (Paris)
Andreas Hüttemann (Cologne)
Daian Bica (Düsseldorf)
James Ladyman (Bristol)
Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf)
Mathilde Escudero (Paris)
Mauricio Suárez (Madrid/Cambridge)
Michela Massimi (Edinburgh)
Sélène Domino (Paris)
Sébastien Rivat (Munich)
Stéphanie Ruphy (Paris)
Thomas Blanchard (Bordeaux)
The workshop will be held in person from 11/06/2026 to 12/06/2026, at
Sorbonne University. Current undergraduate,graduate students (MA and
PhD), and established scholars are welcome to participate. The
application deadline is 01/06/2026 (via our website). There is no
participation fee, but participants must cover their travel and
accommodation expenses. We especially encourage applications from
members of underrepresented groups.
The conference is organised by Adrian Avramoglou (Sorbonne University)
and Daian Bica (HHU Düsseldorf) and is hosted with the support of
Sorbonne University. It is financially supported by Sorbonne University
and FIR, and it also receives additional support from the German Society
for Analytic Philosophy.
